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The Supply of Legal and Illegal Activity: A Choice Theoretic Analysis - Block and Heineke

TH E SUPPLY OF LEGAL AND ILLEGAL ACTIVITY :
A CHOICE THEORETIC ANALYS IS

M. K. Block and J. M. Heineke

"Much of the security of person and property in modern nations is the
effect of manners and opinion rather than law."
John Stuart Mill
Principles of Political Economy
Recently , a number of economists have begun applying modern choice theory to illegal or criminal activities. Almost
without exception, they have emphasized the similarity between the decision to commit an offense and the traditional household choice problem. As Becker [1968, p . 176) , in his pioneering article, expresses the proposition: "Some persons become
'criminals' . . . not because their basic motivation differs from that of other persons, but because their benefits and costs
differ." Although this point is well-taken, we find that Becker, as well as the more recent contributions of Ehrlich [1972], and
Sjoquist [1970] , fail to provide an adequate framewo rk for analyzing the costs and benefits of illegal activities. Specifically,
Becker, Ehrlich, and Sjoquist attempt to summarize the consequences of illegal activities in terms of a distribution on wealth
alone without rigo rously considering t he underlying m ulti-attribute choice problem. That is, the commission of an offense
results in an expenditure of effort (which may engende r feelings of guilt or "wrong doing"), t he possibility of an increase in
the individual's wea lth position, and the possibility of a penalty. Aside from the penalty, the similarity between the offense
decision and the traditional labor supply decision is obvious ) Moreover, if the penalty is a monetary payment, the analogy is
precise. While many criminal choice problems may be viewed within an expended labor ch oice framework, as we shall show,
their interpretation in terms of strictly monetary costs and benefits is not as straightforward.
For the labor allocation problem to be reducible to a monetary cost-benefi t analysis, the agent must be able to express

every effort allocation in terms of a wealth equivalent. While this is conceptually possible in many, but as we shall show not

I
I

all,effort allocation problems, using such a reduction requires detailed preference information. As an illustration of this point,
consider the problem of reducing the traditional household labor supply problem to one that involves only monetary considerations. Graphically, one must locate the optimum labor allocation by finding the wealth intercept, if it exists, of the laborwealth indifference curve along which the familiar tangency condition holds. Hence, all preference information required in
the labor-wealth formulation is also required in the wealth only forml.\lation. The simplicity of the wealth only approach is
more illusory than real, since reductions to this form require complete knowledge of the multi-11ttribute utility function.

1-

j 1See Block and Heineke [ 19731 fo r an analysis of the labor supply decision w h en returns are stochastic.
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We will show below that failure to fully specify the choice problem and therefore the transforma tion between what is
inherently a multi-attribute decision problem and the wealth only problem has led Becker, Ehrlich, and Sjoquist to conclusions
which are valid only in very special cases. In general, we show that plausible preference restrictions are not sufficient to
generate unambiguous supply results, a result that should come as no surprise since it is the same situation that confronts the
investigator in most household allocation problems) Therefore, policy prescriptions in th is area, as in the tax incentive area
do not follow from theory but rather require empirical determination of relative magnitudes.
'
We proceed as follows: In the first section, the notion of the moral or ethical costs of crime are formalized. Next, the
individual's labor-offense supply problem is formulated in terms of the underlying multi-attributed nature of the problem.
We then present a means of transforming multi-attributed preferences into a single attribute, wealth, and reformulate the
supply problem in these terms. This approach provides a straightforward means of comparing the present model to those
adopted elsewhere in the literature.3 Supply responses to various parameter shifts are then investigated. As would be expected,
under "usual" preference restrictions these responses are ambiguous in sign. Since unambiguous results have been reported in the
literature, the next section is devoted to determining the conditions under which unequivocal supply effects obtain. Finally,
results are summarized a nd several areas which require further wo rk are noted.

The Ethical Costs of Crime: Trading Ethics

In order to explore the offense decision in some detail, we restrict our analysis to property crimes. This enables us to
concentrate on what Stigler [1 970] refers to as production offenses. Specifically, we consider an individual who is confronted
with two wealth generating activities, legal activity (labor) and illegal activity (theft) and denote the time spen t in these
activities as L and T, respectively .4 Hence, the individual's evaluation of ;lis well-being at any point in time will be a function
of the time spent generating wealth and the level of his wealth, i.e.
( I)

U = U(L,T,W)

where U is the agent's utili ty indicator and W represents wealth. By explicitly including the psychic costs of legal and illegal
activity in the individual's utility indicator , we are provided with a straightforward means of analyzing the role of moral and
ethical considerations which may constrain the work -theft decision. To the economist, such considerations are specific
restrictions on the manner in which preferences are ordered which, along with numerous other factors, determine the "shape"
of the individual's utility indicator. We term these restrictions the individual's trading ethics and now introduce several des·
criptively interesting trading ethics.

Absolute Honesty
The trading ethic of "absol ute honesty" might be characterized by a preference set in which the rate of substitution of
offenses for wealth is zero for all activity levels and wealth configurations, i.e.
(2)

aw uo =o' L'T'w ~ o
aT

1·

Agents possessing such preferences would all ocate no time to the production of offenses no matter how much labor was
expended and no matter how "desperate" the agent's wealth position might be. Indeed, such an individual may be extremely
adept in the production of offenses, but an absolute aversion to the activity would prevent him from employing his talents.
As will be shown below, this preference restrict ion implies that a monetary cost equivalent to the psychic cost of crime does
not exist.

2 Jn particular , the agent's s imple behavio r toward risk contains qualitative supply i mplications only under highly restrictive circumstances.
3The primary so urce is of co urse Becker I 1968 j. E hrlich's I 1972 1 for thcoming paper is an extension of Becker 's analysis. In addition, Sjoquist
11970 J and Reynolds I 19721 have adopted a choice theoretic approach in their efforts. Each of these author's collapses all costs and benefits
of criminal act ivity into s im ple additions o r subtractions from wealth, and hence adopt ut ility indica to rs which a re a function of the single
attribut e, wealt h.
4Lega l and illegal activity are measured in the same time units and are both considered to be discommodities.
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Relative Honesty
Although individuals displaying absolute honesty are likely to be rare indeed, the same revealed behavior wo uld be
observed for the presumably more common phenomena of "relative honesty." Relative ho nesty arises from preference
restrictions that imply a rate of sub stitution of wealth for theft that is finite but greater than the marginal return to theft for
all L > 0 , T > O and W> O, i.e.

(3)

marginal return to th eft<

aWI 0 < ~'
aT u

L,T,W,;;;;, 0

Unlike absolute honesty, relative honesty is dependent not only upon the agent's preferences but also upon his productivity at transfer. Although both relative and absolute honesty lead to revealed behavior which excludes theft, there is
one important difference: Relative honesty does not exclude illegal behavior, or even specialization in illegal activity, if the
theft production function shifts. For example, in creased skills at theft o r a reduction in either private or collective protection efforts might lead to a non-zero level of theft activity .
Absolute and relative honesty are trading ethics that preclude positive allocations to theft. We now turn o ur att ention
to a set of restrictions that , while accounting for Mills"'manners and opinion," do not necessarily imply a zero theft allocatio n.

Honesty Preference
The individual will be said to display "honesty preference" if the rate of substitution of wealth for offenses is "everywhere" greater than the rate of substitution of wealth for labor. Formally,

(4)

~~ I

uo-

~~I

uo>O, L,T,w ;;;. o

Honesty preference would lead to zero supply of offenses whenever marginal returns from labor were at least as high as
marginal returns from t heft. Jf honesty preference is a gene ral phenomenon, then differences in obse rved behavior of
individuals with respect to pa rticipation illegal activity would renect both ethi cs and opportunities but would em phasize
opportunity se ts more than do the ethics of absolute and relative honesty .5

Ethical Independence
One additional class of trading eth ics is of particular interest - the case of "ethical independence." If K is a constant,
then an econom ic agent will be sa id to exhibit ethical independence if

(5)

Uo = K , L,T,W ~ 0.

Individuals whose preference orderings are consistent with (5) have the same relative "taste (distast e) for crime" no matter
what their wealth may be and no matter how in volved they might be in legal and illegal activities. In other words , the agent's
ethical considerations are independent of both his wealth and his partici patio n rates in income gen erating activities. Ethical
independence is of special interest since it provides an intuitively appealing means of interpreting certain aspects of the Becker
and Ehrlich models vis a vis the more gene ral approach adopted here. As we shall see below, ethical independence plus a
restriction on the manner in which wealth affects "psychic costs" prove to be sufficient fo r reducing the agent's multiattribute supply problem into a simple portfolio prob lem.

-

1
The presumably ver y co mmo n lrading e lhic of "weak ho nesty prt:fer ence" might be depicted as th e case where the rate of su bstit ution
0
~ wealth for offenses is greater than the rate of su bstitutio n of wea lth for labo r for any W, whenever T = L. Of course, weak honesly preference
~1 11 no I gen erall y imply a Ztlro supply of o ffe nses. If margina l re turns to wor k a nd t heft were eq ual , the a ge nt would a llocate more time to W<Jrk
than th.,ft. In fa ct , a high enough rela tive re lurn in thtoft could le ad to specia lizatio n in lhcse activities. In general, the relative magni tudes of T
lnd L wi ll d epen d u po n I h e intens it y o f honesty preferenc". and the ind ividua l's comparative advantage in the two a c t iv ities. Cert ainly weak
~onesty p r eference combined w ith a s ignificant comparative advantage at Iheft is a pla usible hypothesis for explainin g the behavior or' man
tnd~v~duats who specialize in theft. O n the other hand, re lative r eturns for som e individuals could be s u ffic ie n t to ind uce speciali ?.ation in leg:l
1Citvtties.
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Several special cases of ethical independence merit brief attention:
First, ifK =0 in definition (5) above, then we will say the individual is "ethically neutral." Ethically neutral individuals
fi nd legal and illegal activity equally distasteful and in effect combine them under the heading "work." These individuals
probably most adequately represent the caricature of "economic man." Ethically neutral preferences will cause the agent to
specialize in the income generating activity yielding the highest marginal return.
If K > 0, then ethical independence becomes a special case of honesty preference, say "strong honesty preference,"
in which one's "preference for honesty" is invariant to both wealth and activity levels. If K < 0, the symmetric ethic of
"strong dishonesty preference" could be defined.
We h ave discussed several sets of preference restrictions that we termed trading ethics. Clearly, these restrictions are
by no means exhaustive, but instead are intended to indicate the scope of the choice theoretic approach in providing a means
of in terpreting "moral" considerations which may constrain the crime decision.
The Joint Supply of Labor and Offenses
We now turn our attention t o a formal analysis of the individual's joint labor-offense supply decision. We proceed by
first formulating the agent's supply problem in terms of the underlyi ng attributes of the decision and then reformulate the
problem in terms of the wealth argument alone by collapsing psychic costs into their wealth equivalents. Whether consequences of legal and illegal activities are ranked directly in terms of their characteristics (L,T ,W) or indirectly in terms of their
wealth equivalents, depends upon the purposes of investigation . As was noted at the outset, the wealth equivalent formulation
requires the same preference information as does an analysis in terms of direct ran kings. However, if one is interested in cont rasting the characteristics of the offense decision when it is modeled as a labor supply problem, to these same characteristics
when the decision is modeled as an "output" problem, the wealth equivalent formulation provides the deeper insight ; primarily
because it provides a means of analyzing the transformation between the attributes of the offense decision and their wealth
equivalen ts. And it is precisely this point, failure to specify the transformation from psychic costs to their monetary equivalents, that is largely responsible for the uncharacteristically unambiguous results which h ave been reported in t he li terature.
To our knowledge, psychic costs are transformed into wealth equivalents in all of the existing literature on the criminal
choice. For example, Becker [1 968, p. 179] writes, costs " ... can be made comparable by converting them into their
mon etary equivalent ..." While Ehrlich [1972, p . .6] defmes the individual's wealth so that it includes" . .. assets, earnings
within the period and th e 'real wealth' equivalent of non-pecuniary returns from legitimate and illegitimate activity ..."
Or, in the words of Sjoquist [1970 , p. 12], "The psychic costs are measured by that quantity of money having an equivalent
value . .."Yet, in none of these papers, is the character of tllis transformation (psychic costs to wealth equivalents) adequately accounted for, either implicitly or explicitly . Some of the consequences of incomplete specification are explored below.
The following definitions will be used in our analysis: wo -

v
a

0
F

w
"

N

t

the agent's initial wealth
the rate of return to legal activity
the rate of return to illegal activity
the fail ure, capture, or arrest rate. "a" is a
non-negative random variable, 0~ a~ I .
- the number of offenses, 0=0 (T) andO' (T)
- the fine per offense
·- wo + rL + (V . aF)O(T), actual wealth6
- time devoted to non-market activity
- L+T+N

> 0.

Not e t hat the penalty for an offense is specified as a fine . This penalty specification enables us to focus on an issue of central
concern in this paper, the role of ethical considerations in the offense decision.? In addition, according to Becker [1968, p.
193-98] , fines are no t only the most common form of punis1unent, but also the most "efficient."
owe use the term "actua l wealth"to denote t he wea lt h that an indjvidual has ava ilable to

meet his fi nancial obligations. It is his initia l wealth (WO)
plus his earnings or losses dur i n~ the period under consideration. W is a particular value ofW. In the discussion that follows, it is necessar y to formally distinguis h between Wand W.

7For a d iscussion of the rela t ionship between fines and prison sentences as alternative punishmen ts, see Block and Lind [ t 9721.
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The Model
According to the expected utility theorem, the individual's labor-theft supply decision is determined by
(6)

maxjurL,T, WO +rL+(V- a F)O] f(a)da
L, T

subject to the condition that labor and theft levels be non-negative. In (6), f(a) is the agent's subjective probability density on
the arrest rate and indicates the agent's beliefs as to the intervals in which the arrest rate is likely to lie. To simplify the
exposition, we adopt the specification used in Ehrlich [ 1972] and in Reynolds [ 197 1] and fix the amount of time allocated
to non-market act ivities .8 Further, the number of offenses is assumed to be proportional to the time devoted to their production. Under these assumptions the first order condition for a relative maxima requ ires that
(7)

1

EfUT-UL+Uw((V-aF)B'-r)] ..;;; O

where o' = dO /dT. As would be expected , when the psychic cost of effort is afforded its trad itional labor theoretic role, the
agent's simple behavior toward risk (sign Uww) has no unique allocative implications.9 In general , it is sim ply not true, as
Ehrlich [ 1972, p. 9 J maintains, that preferences toward risk and relative returns alone determine the degree of specializa tion.
Onl y in the special case where returns include a highly styli zed renderin g of ethical costs will the assertion be valid.! 0 One
must know something, no t onl y abo ut the agent's behavior toward risk, but also abo ut the relative " irksomeness" of toil in
the alternative occupations. For example , if the individual is risk averse but displays honesty preference, then (V- E(a)F) e'
. r > 0 is a necessary but not suffi cient condition for the commission of offenses . While in this case returns to illegal activity
must be greater than expected costs (where costs consist of the average penalt y plus legal opportunities forego ne) before the
individual would consider committing an illegal act, for this condition to also be sufficient fo rT > 0 , the rate of return must
be sufficiently high to outweigh the psychic disadvantage of pa rticipation in illegal acts. Nonetheless, increasing the certainty
of arrest , increasing penalties, or increasing legal opportunities until "crime does not pay," (V - E(a)FO' - r < 0, will deter
this group of offenders. ll On the o ther hand, if the individual displays both a preference fo r risk and honesty, making
"crime not pay" may not deter participation. Also note that if the individual's preferences are characteri zed by absolute
honesty the stri ct inequal ity in (7) always holds.
The Model in Wealth Equivalent Form
As we have indicated, previous attempts by economists to model the offense decision have postulated an indi vidual who
is able to rank all att ri butes of that decision in terms of wealth alone. And, in most circumstances, this would seem to be a
methodologically valid procedure. But unless one is careful in transforming activit y levels into their wealth equivalents, one
may end up with a model in which all the underlying labor theoretic aspects of the decision have disappeared: In effect, one
no longer has a household supply problem , but a firm supply problem, i.e., one may lose the income term in the traditional
Slutsky equation. To facilitate contrasting the present model to the ex isting li teratu re and to explore more full y the link
between household supply problems and firm "output " problems, we reformulate the above model in terms of wealth
equivalents. To this end we introduce the following
Definition:

"

For an individual possessing wealth stock Wand allocating L' and T' to legal and illegal activities
respectively, W* - W' is termed the wealth equivalent of L* - L' uni ts of legal activi ty and T*- T'
units of illegal activity iff W*, W' , L* and T* satisfy U( L', T' W') = U(L*, T* , W*), where Wis
either W' or W*.1 2

8That is. N ; N, a .:uns tant.
'1Sec u~ck~r ( 1<n t . p. 1(>'l 70) foo a cart!ful disc ussion of the role of psyc hic costs in alloc~ling t ime a m o ng l egal alte rnative income generating
activities. ·1his tr ~atment i, in co ntrast to his rather c~sua l acco unting for psychic costs in the criminal c hoice proble m.
10This point is discussed in m ore de tail below.
11 1t is interesting to note that if the individual d ispla ys risk a version h ut ha s a preference for illegal activities, (UL- UT)
Pay in this sense m ay not det er the ind ivid ual.

>

<o, making crime no t

>

>

1
12 For conven ie nce, 1he reader might ass ume that values o f I. a nd T a rc c hosen so that W* - w'
0. Note that L • - L
0 or T * - T '
0 is
1
1
0. Whether, say , 1.*- L
0 and T * - T
0 is sufficient for W* - w'
0 depends .no t o nly upon the
necessary but not s ufficie nt for W*- w'
1
1
1
1
1
Values L*, L , T * and T hut also upon the indivipual 's trading ethics. For exam ple, if L* - L
0 , T* - T
0 and I L * - L I = I T* - Tl, then the
!lhic of honest y prefere nce wo uld ion ply W* - W

>

>

<

<o.
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To aid in interpreting the definit~on, consider the case where L' == L* and T' == 0. Then W*- W' is the wealth equivalent of'f•
hours of illegal activity. If W' == W, then W* - ~is the payment (bribe) necessary to induce the individual to supply activity
level T*. Whlle if W* ==IN, t hen ~ - W'represents the fine or wealth threat necessary to induce the same supply decision.
If wealth equivalen ts exist for any L ', T ', and -~, then in particular we know there exists a W' such that
(8)

"

U(L*,T*, W):=U(O,O,W'),l 3

i.e., the individual is indifferent between wealth level W' with no effort expended, and wealth level~ with L*and T* expended
~ - W' is the wealth equivalent of L* hours of legal activity and T* hours of illegal activity. As is apparent from (8), W' will i~
general depend upon t he level of activity in legal a nd illegal markets, L * and T*, and actual wealth W. Therefore, the difference
between actual wealth,~, and W', the wealth equivalent, wi ll in general be a function of L*, T* and ~. Formally,

"

"

(9)

W- W'== C(L*,T*,W)

(8')

U(L,T,W) :: U(O,O,W- C(L,T,W)).

Since (9) holds for all L * and T*

"

"

"

C is the function that maps the various effort allocations and levels of wealth into their monetary equivalent. ln other words
C is the "cost" of L and T fo r any~.
'
It is, of course, possible to express the trading ethics discussed above either in terms of the defln ition of wealth
equivalence or in terms of the cost function , C. For example:

(i)

Abso lute honesty is the case where there exists no W*(W') such that U(L' ,o,w') == U(L ,T*,W*) fo r any W'
(W*) and T * > 0. Intuitively, there exists no increment nor decrement to wealth that would induce the
individ ual to provide a non-zero supply of theft. No wealth equivalent exists.l4 Alternatively, the individual
exhibits absolute honesty iff there does not exist 0 < W < 00, such that CT < oo, L,T, > 0.

I

I

In terms of the cost function, the individual demonstrates:
(ii)

Honesty Preference iff CT- CL > 0, L, T, W> 0

(iii)

Ethical Independence iff (CT- CL)/(1 -Cw) ==consta nt, L,T,W, > 0 and

(iv) Ethical Neutrality iff CT - CL == 0, L, T, W,> 0.
The supply analysis that follows is in terms of the utility indicator on the right hand side of (8'). As mentioned above,
thls procedure enables us to interpret the existing literature within the more general labor economic framework.

Supply Behavi.or and Policy Changes 15
In this section, we post a number of questions concerning the supply behavior of a single agent. In particular, we investi·
gate the agent's supply response to changes in (i) initial wealth, (ii) the pay-off to illegal activity, (iii) the wage rate, (iv) the arrest
rate, and (v) the severity of punishment.

l 3Choosing w' in th is manner transform s the disutility of effort into a simple substraction from wealth and per mits expression of the labor
su pply problem solely in terms of wealt h.
1

14M ore forma lly, U(L ,0,~) > U(L ,T * ,W*) for arb it rarily large w•, and U( L ,0 ,0) > U(L ,T* ,W), for T * > 0. Hence, it is not possible in
this case to red uce the m ulti-attribute decision problem to a d ecisio n problem defined o n wealth alone.
1

1

I Sln the d iscussion t hat fo llows, we assume internal sol ut io ns ex ist to first order cond itions.
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To begin, we employ identity (8') and rewrite first order condition (7) as
(7')

E[Uw(O ,O,~-C) (((V-aF)O'-r) (1-Cw) + CL- CT]] ~ 0

BY (8') E [UT(L,T,~)- UL(L,T,~)] = EUw(o,o;W-C) (CL -CT) and hence Uw(O,O,~-C) is the "utili!Y weight"that transfor'!ls
changes in "costs," CL- CT, ~nto the appropriate utility changes. In addition, the term Uw(O,O,W-C) (1-Cw) =Uw(L,T,W)
by (8'). To interpret Uw(O,O,W-C) (1-Cw) , assume, as is fl!OSt likely, Cw > 0 and no te that a one dolla r increase in wealth generates an increase in "well being" of less than Uw(O,O,W-C) , since increases in wealth increase the payment the individual
would be willing to make not to supply a given amount of effort. The value of the "net" increase in wealth to the individual
is Uw(O,O ,W-C) ( 1-Cw).
In most of the comparative static derivatives which follow, second derivatives of U appear in product expectations.
This points up a well-known cha racte ristic of stochastic models, viz. that a qualitative analysis of parameter shifts in these
models often requi res third derivative information concerning the age nt's utility indicator. The customary me thod of providing this information is to postulate plausible hypotheses regarding the agent's behavior toward risk as various arguments of
the utility indicator change. For example, ifU = U(L,T,W) then R =-Uww(L,T,W)/Uw(L,T,W) has been termed the coefficient
of absolute risk aversion. And if the agent becomes increasingly willing to accept a wealth gamble of a given size as his
wealth increases, he is said to display decreasing abso lute risk aversion, i.e. a iVaW< 0. This restriction on the agent's preferences has been widely uti lized and has led to many interesting res ults.l 6 An important question concerns the relation
between Rand the analogous coefficient defined on the wealth equivalent utility formulation, say, R.= -Uww(O,O,'W-C)/Uw
(O,O,W-C). Although it would seem entirely reasonable to require R =R for all L, T, and W, to our knowledge this topic has
not been investigated .1 7

Wealth Effects
A question of considerable interest to both criminologists and economists is the effect on the level of criminal activity
of changes in the potential criminal's "initial wealth:' For example, would increased welfare payments have incentive or
disincen tive effects on the supply of offenses. To investiga te this question, differentiate (7') with respect to wo. ln which
case
(10)

aT/ aW0

=

-E [Uw[((V-aF)O'-r) (-Cww) + CLW- CTW] +
[((V-aF) O'-r) (1-Cw) + CL- CT] (1-Cw) Uww]/HTT

where H =EU (o,o ;w- C(L,T,W)] .
Neither decreasing absolute risk aversion nor decreasing absolute aversion combined with any of the above trading
ethics provide sufficient in format ion to deduce the inferiority of illegal activity. Only a priori considerations can sign aT I awo
at this level of generality. Undoubtedly, such considerations would lead most economists to argue that effort expended
generating income in either legal or illegal markets is an inferior activity. And indeed , any analysis which im plied the normality
of "work" would be considered l1ighly suspect.

Payoff Effects
To our knowledge, most of the research on illega l activities has focused directly on de terran ce and hence payoff effects
on the supply of these activities have been largely ignored .18 This neglect appea rs even in much of the recent economics of
crime Literature. For example, alt hough Becker includes " net returns" in his form ulation, it is not central to his supply of
offenses analysis. Certainly, any analysis of property crimes must include an examination of payoff effects as a matter of

--

16For example, Sandmo [ 1970, 1971
17

1, Le land ( 1968, 197 1, 1972(, Mossin l1 968a, 1968b I and Block a nd Heineke [ 1972a, 1972b, 1973(.

To simplify n otat io n in the work that fo llows, Uw will be used to r epresen t Uw(O,O,W-C) un less ot he rwise indicated.

18
See Schrag 11 97 1, pp. 20- 1131 for a brief sur vey o f the crim ino logica l li terature in this a rea.
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central concern.
(II)

aTtav=-EUw(I-Cw)O'/Hrr + o aTtawo.

Equation (11) is the stochastic ana log of the familiar Slutsky expression composed of a substitution effect and a wealth
effect. Since HIT and 1-Cw are negative and positive respectively, the substitution term is positive. 19 Hence, the direction
of the supply response will depend upon the wealth effect. If theft is an inferior activi ty, as is most likely, no qualitative
conclusions are forthcoming.
Of course, this comes as no surprise. Economists have long known that "price effects" in household decision models are
ambiguous in sign. With no further preference informat ion tile sufficient condition for a positive supply response is the
normality of illegal activity. Without this condition , the possibility that theft is a Giffen act ivity cannot be dismissed.

Wage Effects
The thesis that poverty causes crime20 and the Skinnerian prescription for extinguishing crimi nal behavior ... "by
seeing to it that it goes unrewarded and (by) reinforc(ing) some more acceptable form of behavior," might be interpreted as
expressions of the hypothesis that increased legal opportunities have a deterent effect on the offense decision .2 1 This hypothesis
is of more than passing interest. If valid, the major eff01 t in American correct ional institutions to retra in and "rehabilitate"
the individual offender may be justified. For the important case where illegal behavior is an inferior activity, our model sup.
ports this hypothesis. To see this, consider the following derivative:
(1 2)

aTtar= EUw(l-Cw)/HTT + L aTjawo

Since the substitution effect of a change in legal returns is negative, increased legal opportunities will deter offenders if theft
is an inferior activity .22

Enforcement Effects
In the model being investigated in this paper, uncertainty is introduced through the enforcement variable "a". The
payoff and penalty are both assumed to be known but the frequency of penalty imposition (the arrest rate) "a" is taken by the
agent to be a random va riable . This specification is a generalization of the Becker and Ehrlich Bernoulli formulations.

The relation between the offense decision and changes in the degree of enforcemen t has been a topic of long-s tanding
speculation. But because the arrest rate is a random variable there is no unique interpreta lion of an increase in enforcement.
However, an intuitive approach is to consider changes in enforcement procedures that increase the expected number of arrests
but leave all other moments of f(a) unaltered. Tha t is, we consider a "pure" increase in the arrest rate. This may be accomplished
by replacing "a" in (7') with a+o, where o is a mean altering, dispersion preserving parameter. Differentiating with respect
to oand evaluating at o=0 yields:
( 13)

artao = -F -cartav)

As we have noted, the sufficient condition for unambiguously signin g aT{av is to assume the normality of illegal activity.
Hence, for th.is class of penalties, we are able to assert unequivocally the deterrent effect of increases in the arrest ralt
(aTjao < 0) _only by making this rather disturbingassumption. Of course, the reason for sign amb igui ty in (13) is that increases
in E(a) decrease expeqted returns, which in turn decrease the individual's expected wealth. Decreases in expected wealth mOll
likely lead to increases in effort expended. That is, an increase in E(a) has an incentive effect in the wealth term of(l3)if
19 J -Cw

>o by identit y (s').

20This thesis has long been popular in criminology. See Void's ) I 95 8, p. I 69] survey of the literature about w hich he states, " ... the conclusiot
has usuall y been taken for granted that poverty and unemployment are major factors prod ucing crimin ality."
l iThe Skinnerian inter pretat ion of the crime prevention problem is discussed in Conrad 1 t 96S, p. 303 ) .
1~The r~ader will note that f ixing the t ime a llocation to non-market activities implies legal and illega l activities are net stochastic substitutes.
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criminal activities are inferior, and a disincentive effect in the substitution term.
Penalty Effects
ln the past decade we have witnessed a heated polemic concerning the effects of changes in the severity of punishment
on the crime rate. Protagonists of the "liberal" position have often claimed that increasing the severity of punishment has
little or no deterrent effect on the supply o f offenses while more "conservative" individuals have denounced this group as "soft
on crime " and recommen ded increased penalties to combat growing crime rates. Al though much of this argument h as been
couched in ideological considerations, the central question concerning the supply effects of changes in the severity of punishment is a major concern of policy makers. We n ow consider this question in the context of the present model.
The first order conditions, (7') indicate that three "pieces of information" jointly d etermine the o ffen se level: th e
net rate of return to theft , the individual's behavior toward risk and his trading ethics. Hence , by examini ng (7') one can find
several combinations of trading ethics an d behavior toward risk which would result in zero offenses for sufficiently severe
penalties. Fo r example, if the world were comprised of risk averse individua ls who possessed the trading ethic of honesty
preference, then the supply of offenses could be driven to zero by making F sufficien tly large. However, this may not be
possible, and if not, the question of the supply response to a change in the severity of the penalty must be formulated in
terms of marginal changes in the penalty .
Since F is deterministic , the interpretation of a change in the penalty is straightforward. In fact, increases in Fact as
scale changes on the random variable "a," decreasing expected returns and increasing the dispersion of returns. Formally
(14)

aT/aF = EUw(I-Cw)aO' / HTT + OE [Uwa [((V-aF) 8 '-r) (-Cww) +
CLW- CTW] + Uwwa [((V-aF)O'-r) (1-Cw) + CL- CT] (1 -CW)J /Hrr

Inspection of (14) reveals the substitution effect of a change in penalty to be negative and the wealth effect to be
unsigned without further preference information. Hence, at least at the present level of generality, arguments alleging t he
disincentive effects of increases in the severity of punishmen t are not unambiguously supported by theory.
We have seen that if the multi-attributed nature of the individua l's decision p roblem is properly accounted for, then
the "usual " preference restrictions concerning the individual's behavio r towa rd risk will not provide sufficient information
to sign the supply effects of increased "payoffs," "enforcement," and " penalties." The core of the problem is of course the
fact that wealth effects are unsigned. And, assuming theft to be an inferior activity does not alleviate the ambiguity, since
relative m agnitude difficulties then arise in each case.
Above we alleged that fa ilure to fully specify the choice problem and therefore the transformation between the multiattribute decision problem and the wealth only problem had led Becker and Ehrlich to conclusions which are valid only in
special cases.23 An interesting question thus arises. What assumptions concerning this tran sformation are implicit in the
several unambiguous results reported by these authors? Or more generally , given the supply problem as posed in (6), under
what conditions do changes in the various components of the return to illegal activity lead to unambiguous supply responses?
It is to this question that we now turn.
Ethical Costs and Wealth: The Case of Independence
Up to this point, we have analyzed the offense decision in terms of a fu lly general wealth equivalent. That is, the "cost"
function, C = C(W ,L ,T), was unrestricted in all arguments; only sign and magnitude restrictions that followed directly from
the definition of wealth as a com modity and labor as a discommodity were employed in the analysis. As we have seen, the
price of this generality is qualitative ambiguity. In particular, the unambiguous results reported by Becker and Ehrlich are
not forthcoming when the offense decision is analyzed as a general multi-attribute decision problem.24 However, if one is

-

23
We will d irect any furth er remarks to the work of Becker and E hrlich only. The Sjoq uist paper, among o ther t hings, utilizes several extremely
restrictive assumptions and for this reason is o f less interest than t he Becker and Ehrlich papers.
24
The o nly exception t o this statement is the respon se of o ffenses due to a change in p (the Bernoulli parameter), a result that is r eported in both
Becker and Ehrlich. A ltho ugh the reported result holds after the problem is properly specified, it is rescued o nly because of the extremely s imple
density employed in their analyses. The Bernoulli is discussed in more detail below.
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willing to place a priori restrictions on the form of the transformation between the multi-attribute decision and its wealth
eq uivalent, then traditional assumptions concerning behavior toward risk will often sign supply effects.
In the work that follows, we explore the implications of assumi ng that the "net returns" to crime are independent of
the individual 's wealth level. Note that this is precisely the assumption that is implicit in the analysis of criminal activity
presented by both Becker and Erhlich.25 By neglecting to specify the tran sformation between the underlying multi-attribute
decision problem and their "wealth only" problem, they fail to account for the interaction between changes in wealth and
ch anges in the psychic costs of crime. This omission is equivalent to the assumption that Cis independent ofW, i.e., C == C
(L,T). Or, in more traditional terms, under conditi ons of certainty, the all ocations to theft and labor are invariant to changes
in wealth. From t he perspective of trading ethics, the assumption that C = C(L,T) implies that honesty (dishonesty) preference
is constant in wealth.

Wealth Effects (Cw = 0)
While the assumptio n that "ethical cost s," C, are independent of wealth would not appea r to be widely applicable, one
should judge this assumption, as all assumptions, by its implications. To this end we replace C(L,T,W) in (8') with C(L,T).ln
which case equation (10) becomes
(10')

3T/3WO=-EUww[(V-aF)O' -r+CL-CT]/HTT

As is obvious, the agent's simple behavior toward risk (thy sign of Uww) provides sufficient information for signing
(10') only in the trivial cases of risk neutrality or quadratic utility . Generally, third derivat ive info rmation will be needed. lf
the individual is risk averse, the Arro w-Pratt measure provides the needed information. As is well-known, if this measure
decreases in wealth (3R/3W < 0), then the numerator of (10') is negative.26 The crucial requirement, which is absent in the
general wealth equivalent, is that the nonlinear portion of the wealth constraint be non-random . This is precisely t he effect of
making C independent of wealth. We now have
(15)

aT;awo > o.27

Inequality (1 5) gives the first clear indication that the labor theoretic structure of the basic problem has been ab rogated.

If the psychic costs of effor t are independent of wea lth, and if the agent exhibits decreasing absolute risk aversion, then effort
expended generating income via illegal activity will increase with wealth. Theft is a normal activity. 28 This disturbing impti·
cation is a direct result of "independence" which collapses the labor supply problem into an "output" problem; for indeed in
t his class of problems, decreasing absolute risk aversion implies risky assets are normal goods.29

It is of interest to briefly re-examine several of the other supply effects reported above for the case where C and Ware
independent.

25Evidence supporting t his assertion appears t hro ughout the Becker and E hrlich papers. For example, see Ehrlich ( 19?2, p . 12( w~1ere he states
that the sign of wea lth effects, produced by equal proportiona l increases in w:alt~ in ever~ stat ~ of the world, is determmed b~ the_s1gn of t he co·
efficient of relative r isk aversion. It is easily shown t hat the coefficient of relat1ve n sk aversiOn will s1gn wel(lth e ffects generated m th1s manner only
if C is independ ent of wea lt h.
26For proof of a fo rmally identical proposit io n , see Sand mo's (I 97 1, p. 68-69( demonstration o f the negative output effects associated wit h changes
in f ixed cost s.

=

=

27This result iS also forthcoming if Cww 0 and R R, w here Rand R repr esent the coefficien t o f absolute risk aversion associa t ed wit h the util·
ity indi cators o n t he left and right hand s ides o f identity (8) respectively.
28This result is reported in E hrlich (1 970, p. 3 1).
29we have used t he designations "output" prob lem and "portfolio" prohlem. Usua lly both ter ms refer to problems in which wealt h is the sole argu·
ment in the utility indicat or, the d ifference being that output problems in clude non linear definitio ns of wealth while portfo lio proble ms are chat·
acterized by w hat Arrow has called "constant stochastic returns." As far as wealth effects arc concerne d , both output and por tfo lio models yieiJ
the result that risky assets are normal goods, as long as nonlinearities are non -rando m.

10

The Supply of Legal and Illegal Activity: A Choice Theoretic Analysis - Block and Heineke

payoff Effects {Cw= 0)
For the case at hand, equation {11 ) above becomes

The substitution effect in {11' ) is obviously positive and as we have seen, under the Arrow-Pratt hypothesis the wealth effect
is also positive. Hence, if psychic costs are invariant in wealth and if absolute risk aversion decreases in wealth, t hen the agent
will unambiguously devote more hours to illegal activity as the return to these activities increases.

Enforcement Effect s (CW = 0)
Derivative {13) is, of course, still
{13')

aT;a8

=-F{aT;av) ,

where 8 is the mean altering dispersion preserving parameter defined above, which was used as an additive shift on the random
variable a. But, as has been noted, unlike the case of the general wealth equivalent, aR;aw < 0 here implies the normality of
illegal activity and therefore increases in the arrest rate will produce an unambiguous deterrent effect on the supply of offenses.

Penalty Effects {Cw = 0)
This case is a bit messier since shifts in F "scale" the random variable a. When Cw = 0 equation ( 14) becomes
(1 4')

aTjaF

= E(Uwa)fl' / HTT + E[Uww{{V-aF)fJ'-r + CL - CT)a] / HTT

Since Uw and "a" are each non-negative random variables, the first term in this expression is clearly negative. In
addition, it is easy to show that decreasing absolute risk aversion implies the numerator of the second term is positive.30
Therefore, both terms are negative and we have the result reported by Becker [1 968, p. 177] in his paper: Increases in
"punishment" unequivocally red uce the incentive to engage in illegal activities. Notice that two assumptions support t his
result. The first is the independence of psychic costs and wea lth which as we have seen is implicit in both the Becker and
Ehrlich models. The second is decreasing absolute risk aversion, an assumption which will be needed unless f(a) is restricted
to a particularly simple density function. Indeed, if Cw = 0 and f(a) is Bernoulli, risk aversion alone is sufficient fo r (14')
to be negative. Before briefly examining th e Bernoulli , we consider the effect on the supply of offenses of one additional
parameter shift, a shift discussed by both Becker and Ehrlich.
Pure Dispersion Changes:
The relation between the offense decision and the degree of certainty with which the penalty is administered has been
debated endlessly by criminologists. Well over a century and a half ago, Sir Samuel Romilly, in a series of debates with
William Paley, held that not only did certainty of punishment deter criminal activities, but also that certainty of punishment
was more crucial than severity. "So evident is the truth of this maxim that if it were possible that punishment could be
reduced to an absolute certainty a very slight penalty would be sufficient to deter almost every species of crime .. ."31
Modern support for this position has come from the field of experimental psychology. For example, Dr. Azrin holds that if
punishment is to be an effective deterrent, it must be de livered immediately and with certainty .32 We next determine whether
the present model contains any implications concerning the deterrent effects of increases in the certainty of punishment.

-

>

30To see this, let Z ::;:;(V-aF)f} -r+CL- CT and let W be !!!at wealth level such that Z = 0. We must show E(~Za)
0. If Z ~0, t he n aR<(a R)
Where (aR) s ignifies that the product aR is evaluated at Wand he nce is non-random. Therefore, -ZaUww <(aR)UwZ. If Z< 0 the a na logo
rgument yields the same resu lt: Hence, -E(UwwZa) <(aR)E(UwZ). But E(UwZ) is the n ecessary condition for an internal maximum and n •• st be
zero. Therefore, E(UwwZa) 0.
1

>

31

This debat e is reported in Michae l and Wichsler [ 1940, p. 25 0ff.J.

32
The work of Azrin is discussed in Honig [I 960, p. 380 J.

11

Santa Clara Business Review

A widely utilized method of studying the effects of changes in the dispersion of a random variable consists of using a
combination of a multiplicative and an additive parameter shift on the variable in question. The multiplicative shift "spreads''
the density, while the additive shift is used to keep the mean of the variable unchanged.33 To assess the supply effects of a
change in the dispersio n of punishment , we apply the add itive shift parameter to "a", say 'f, which in turn acts as a multiplicative shift on F. The parameter 'f is restricted to ensure E(aF) is unchanged.34 It is in teresting to note that dispersion
changes generated in this manner are formally identical to the changes in the probabili ty of arrest "compensated" by changes
in the penalty reported by Becker [1 968, p. 178] and Ehrlich (1972, p. 11 ] .
Differentiating (7') with respect toT and evaluating the result at 'f = 0 we have
(16)

aT/ aT= -F/E(a)[Cov(Uw ,a)B' + 8 Cov [UWW((V-aF) 8' · r + CL · CT),a 1] /HTT35

unlike ·the other comparative static results reported in this section , decreasing absolute risk aversion will not be sufficient to
sign (16). For risk averse agents Cov(Uw,a) is obviously positive, but non-linear trading ethics, CL · CT, prevent further
analysis of the second convariance term. It would seem that this term can be signed only if the function C(L,T) is linear, i.e.
if the individual displays ethical independence.36 In which case it can be shown that aRtaw < 0 implies the second covariance
in {16) is positive and therefore
(17)

aTt aT>o.37

Given the preference restrictions which have been enumerated, the model supports the hypothesis that increases in the
certainty of arrest induce disin centive effects. But clearly, this is not the point that deserves amplificati on. The seemingly very
plausible hypothesis that increases in the certainty of arrest will discourage criminal activi ty, a hypothesis that is often accepted
as fact, rests upon a series of preference restrictions, several of which are quite exacting. To wi t : (i) the individual is risk
averse and (ii) displays decreasing absolute risk aversion ; (iii) the "psychic costs" of theft are independen t of the individual's
wealth and (iv) the individual exhibi ts ethical independence, CL · CT = constant. As we have seen, (iii) reduces what is
essentially a labor supply problem to an output problem and wi th (i) and (ii) implies theft is a normal activity. (iv) goes one
step furthe r and reduces the output problem to a problem characterized by "constant stochastic returns," a portfolio prob·
lem.38
Interpreted in an alternative manner, inequality (I 7) may be viewed as a more general rendering of Becker's [ 1968, p.
178] result that compensated increases in the arrest rate reduce the number of offenses less than compensated increases in the
penalty if the agent is risk averse and have the same effect if the agent is risk neutral, i.e. aT/aT = 0 if Uww=0.39 These
results were also reported by Ehrlich. Recall that the result reported in (I 7) rests on the fou r preference restrictions listed in
the previous paragraph. Since Becker and Ehrlich report the same result using only (i), we next briefly consider their models.40

33For example, see Sandmo [1970,1971 1, Leland [19721 and Block and Heineke [ 1973 j.
34Formally, dE(a +'f)F/d'f= 0 and hence dFfdT = -F/E(a) whenT = 0.
3Sof course, Cw = 0 in this derivative. If not, there is no possibiUty of extracting qualitative information.
36Note that if Cw = 0 then ethical independence implies CL · CT = K.

37oefine Z =: (V • aF)8' · r + CL - CT. We are to show Cov(UwwZ,a)=: E[ UwwZ(a - J.l a) I > 0. No te that Z - IJ.Z =ca - IJ.a) (-F8 1) and henct
E(UwwZ(a- J.la) ]=: -F8 'E [ UwwZ(Z-JJ.z) ]=: -F 8'[EUwwz2 -J.l zEUwwZ ]. For risk averse individuals Euwwz2 <oand if aRtaw<o then EUWW
z > 0 by ( 1 O') and (IS) above. The only remaining unsigned item is J1 z. If the individual exhibits ethical independence, the necessary condi·
tion for a non -zero supply of offenses is J.lz > 0. Therefore, the term in brackets is negative and Cov(UwwZ,a)> o.
,
38see f.n. 29 above.
39To interpret aTta-rin terms of the Becker result, note that "a" is increased and F is decreased such that E(aF) is constant. Since OTtaT> 0,
the decrease in F has the greater effect on T.
40since Ehrlich's model generalized Becker's work we restrict our subsequent analysis to Ehrlich's model. The conclusions drawn hold a fortiori
for the Becker model.
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A. Specific Subjective Density: The Bernoulli
In the analysis above we have assumed only the existence of a subjective probability distribution f(a). This is a much
rnore general approach than has been adopted in previous work. Becker's pioneering work in the area and Ehrlich's extension
both assume "a" is either one or zero with f(l) = p and f(O) = 1-p. i.e., f(a) is Bernoulli . In other w·ords , in the Becker and
Ehrlich formulations the individual is assumed to make decisions as if the only possible outcomes are total failure (he is
caught for all offenses) or complete success (he is not caught for any offense). This is in contrast to the present form ulation
in which the "arrest rate" or "failure rate" may take on any value between 0 and 1. In other words, in the model employed up
to tlus point, the individual is free to consider all failure possibilities. While both Ehrlich and Becker suggest that their results
are forthconling for more general densities, as the results above indicate, this is not the case.41 However, because the Bernoulli
density significantly simplifies comparative static derivatives, it does enable us to focus on the precise nature of the preference
assumptions underlying the Ehrlich and Becker analysis.
To see the implications of this density, let f(a) be Bernoulli in the wealth equivalent version of equation (6). In this
case expected utility is
(18)

pU[WO + rL + (V-F)8- C(L,T,W)] + (1-p)U(WO + rL + V8- C( L,T,W")]

For convenience, we define w' = wo + rL + (V-F)8 and w"= wo + rL +VB. Note that equation (18) is the Ehrlich model if C
(L,T,W) is not subsumed into V .42 It is, of course, this subsuming of "psychic elements" into the net monetary benefits and
costs of crime as well as the use of a Bernoulli distribution that restri cts the Ehrlich and Becker formulations. While both
authors claim to include both monetary and psychic benefits and costs in revenue and cost functions, as we have seen, their
implicit assumptions concerning psychic costs and benefits are quite severe.
To examine the essential elements of these preference restrictions, it is sufficient to consider the effect on illegal
activity of a "compensated" increase in the arrest rate. A compensated increase in the arrest rate consists of an increase in
the arrest rate compensated by a decrease in the penalty, so that the effect of both changes is to leave the expected punishment
(pF) unchanged. While Becker and Ehrlich employ equal and opposite percentage changes in p and F to accomplish this
compensated change, it may also be performed by simply setting
d(pF)/dp = F + p(dF/dp) = 0
and hence dF/dp is equal to -F/p. This latter approach has the advantage of emphasizing the relationship between compensated
changes in p and the more general dispersion changes discussed above. Within the Bernoulli framework, the Becker-Ehrlich
compensated change is a change in the dispersion of returns to illegal activity.
To proceed, note that

(19)

aT/ 3'f=3T/3p- (3T/3F) (F/p),

where 3T/31' is the effect on illegal activity of a mean preserving (or compensated) change in p, and 3T/3p and 3T/3F are the
effects on T of changes in p and F respectively. Since the individual's optimal level of illegal activity is obtained by maximizing
(18), if we define W= W -C(L,T,W ')and W. = W" -C(L,T,W''), (19) may be written as
(19')

3T/31' = {-Uw(W) [(V8' -r) (1-Cw(L,T,W))+CL(L,T,W')-CT(L,T,W')]
+Uw@) [V8' -r) (1-Cw(L,T,W")+CL(L,T,W")-CT(L,T,W")]
-FOUw(W) [CLW(L,T,W')-CTW(L,T,W')-Cww(L,T,W') ((V-F)8'-r)]
-F 8Uww(W) (1 -CW(L,T,W')) T((V-F) 8'-r) (1-Cw(L,T,W'))
+CL(L,T,W')-CT(L,T,W')] }/G~3

41 For exa mple, Ehrlich [1972, p. 9) stat es, "Although our model has been illustrated for two states of the world, the analysis equall y well appUes
ton stat es ... "
42 There does remain one minor difference between the model specified in (J 8) and the Ehrlich formulation. Specifically, Ehrlich a llows for variable punishment by co nsidering a punishment function F(8).
43 RecaU that time allocated to non-market activities is fixed.
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(1 -p)U(~).

where G= pU(W) +
ll is important to note that, in general and contrary to the assert ions made by both Beckeranct
Eh rlich, simple behavior towa rds risk (sign Uww) is not sufficient to establish the qual itative effect of a compensated change
in p. That is, the sign of (19' ) is not uniquely determined by the individual's simple behavior toward risk . To sign (19')
one must have information not only on the individual's behavior toward risk but also on the properties of the cost function C.
We now show that it is an implicit assumption about ethical costs that allow these authors to infer the effect of a compensated
change in p from the sign of Uww alone.
To see this, consider the special case in which ethical costs are independent of the individual's wealth position . Under
this condition (1 9' ) is grea tly simplified and may be rewritten as follows :

(19")

oTfa"f'=

l -Uw(W) [(VO'-r)+C L(L,T)-CT(L,T)
+Uw(~ [(YO' -r)+CL(L,T)-CT(L,T)l

-FOUww(W) [((V-F) 0'-r)+CL(L,T)-CT(L,T)]! /GTT
Equation ( 19") is the result obtained by Ehrlich and is, in fact, identical to his expression fo r a compensated change in
p except for the fact that in ( 19") ethical costs are not aggrega ted into "net" returns and the penalty is fixed .44 Ehrlich, and
Becker in a less rigoro us fashio n, implicitly assume that eth ical costs are independent of wealt h. This assumption carries a
n umber of disquieting implications. For example, if the individual, say displays honesty preference, then these "tastes" for
honesty are inva riant to changes in the individual's wealth level. Ind ividuals who differ greatly in their wealth positions, but
onl y in wealth positions, will display equal in tensity of honesty preference·. Equa lion (19") describes such an ind ividual's
reaction to a compensated change in p.
It is straightforwa rd to show that the sign of ( 19") is uniquely determined by the individual's simple behavior toward
risk, i.e. the sign of Uww.45 For exam ple, if the ind ividual is risk ave rse (19") will be positive and a compensated increase in
the arrest rate (p) will increase the individual's allocation to illegal activities. In other words, under the condition that ethical
costs are independent of wealth, a decrease in the dispersion of returns to illegal activit ies, when the density is Bernoulli, will
unambiguously lead a risk averse individua l to increase his supply of such activities. Crucial in this result is the specific density
and the independence of ethical costs and wealth. As we have shown above, if the density is not Bernoulli and/or ethical costs
are net independent of wealth, simple behavior toward risk is not sufficient to establish th e effect of mean preserving dispersion
changes .

Since the crucia l assumption underlying Becker's and Ehrlich's analyses is the independence of ethical costs and wealth,
it is well to recall one of the implications of this assumption. For any density, incl ud ing the Bernoulli, this assumption impl ies
that illegal activity is a normal activity for all those individuals whose absolute aversion to risk is non-increasing in wealth.
In other words, if we make the common and as yet empiricall y unrefuted assumption that an individual's coefficient of
absolute risk aversion (R) decreases in wealth , the independence of ethical costs and wealt h implies that illegal act ivity will be
an increasing function of wealth.46 Surely this is, at best, an uncomfortable impl ication of the independence assumption.

44see Ehrlich 11 972, f .n. 14, p. 55 J.
45To s~e I his , not e t hat ((V -F)

0'-ncl. ( L,T) - CT(L,T)) < o and

(V0'-r+C J. (L.T) - CT ( L. ,T))

>o b y the firsl

1 h~ s~cond o rder cond it ion. Therefore, t he sign of the first two terms o n t he fi g ht hand side of ( 19

11
)

o rder condit io n a nd GTT

w ill be det er mined by the s ign of

<o by

Uww· Since

l h~ sign of these term s w ill be opposite that of Uww. the sign of Uww uniquely del ermines the s ig n of (I •/'). In fact, wit h Cw = 0, aT/O"f'

o iff uww

.;;;;;

>
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summary
We have examined in some detail the individual's choice among two income gene rating alternatives, one legal and one
illegal. Un like the literature in this area, the problem was formulated in terms of the underlying multi-attributed structure of
preferences which is inherent to household decision problems. This approach permitted us to focus attention on the role of
1110ral and ethical considerations wh ich may constrain the decision maker - considerations we have termed "trading ethics"
and which heretofore have not been accorded explicit attention.
Although authors of previous work in th is area have assumed that individuals order thei r preferences in terms of the
wealth attribute alone, they purport to fully account for "trading ethics." We have shown that this is not the case .Clearly,
collapsing preferences into orderings on wealth alone can provide on ly illusory simplification, since the same preference
info rmation that is explicit in multi-attribute orderings must be impli cit in "wealth only" orderings. Indeed, "simplifications''
wltich may appear to be forthcoming are the result of a failure to carefully specify th e transformation between the multiatt ribute model and its si ngle attribute equivalent.
To provide a vehicle for contrasting our model to previous work, we formalized the notion of the wealth equivalent of
an act ion. This concept, when appropriately defined, insures that the original and transformed decision problems are identical.
We next explored the supply response of variations in several policy instruments, and fo und, as would be expected, that
no supply implications were forthcoming under "usual" preference restrictions, although "substitution effects" were signed.
The problem was of course that wealth effects were indeterminate in sign. To deal with this problem and to provide a link to
the Literature, we introduced the assumpt ion that "ethical costs" are independent of wealth, an assumption implicit in the work
of Becker and Ehrlich; in which case the pervasive qualitative ambiguity disappeared. But it was at this poin t that we got the
first clea r indicat ion that the in trinsic labor theoretic structure of the problem had been violated: Independence of wealth and
ethical costs and decreasing absol ute risk aversion impl ied theft is a normal activity. Formall y, Cw = 0 reduced the household
supply problem to a firm outp ut problem. But even decreasing absolute risk aversion and the independence of ethical costs and
wealth did not provide suffi cient information to assess the effects of increases in the arrest rate that are compensated by an
equal percen tage reduction in the penalty. Analytically, such changes are pure dispersion changes in the ne t return, and appear
to be signab le only for the case of "constant stochastic returns"; that is, only if the "output" problem is further reduced to a
"portfolio" problem. Finally, we briefly reconsidered the effect of such dispersion changes within the context of a further
simplifica tion - the case where the individual's density over outcomes is Bernoulli.
Although the present paper generalizes previous work, a great deal of work remains to be done . Among the most
important immediate extensions of o ur analysis is the need to more adequately account for penalties, especially imprisonment, which is a unique pricing device due to the direct physical restraints on the individual's choices. In addition, the
decision makers choice set should be expanded to include substitution, not only among alternative income-generating activities , but also bet ween income-generat ing activi ties and leis ure. Both problems are under investigation by the present authors
and are rife with perplexing problems.
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